The consolidation of a universal health system coupled with a process of regional devolution characterise the institutional reforms of the National Health System (NHS) in Spain in the last two decades. However, scarce empirical evidence has been reported on the effects of both changes in health inputs, outputs and outcomes, both at the country and at the regional level. This paper examines the empirical evidence on regional diversity, efficiency and inequality of these changes in the Spanish NHS using cross-correlation, panel data and expenditure decomposition analysis. Results suggest that besides significant heterogeneity, once we take into account region-specific needs there is evidence of efficiency improvements whilst inequalities in inputs and outcomes, although more 'visible', do not appear to have increased in the last decade. Therefore, the devolution process in the Spanish Health System offers an interesting case for the experimentation of health reforms related to regional diversity but compatible with the nature of a public NHS, with no sizeable regional inequalities.
Introduction
Universal access and an important devolution process of health care to the Spanish regions (Autonomus Communities, AC from now) are the main features of an evolving public health system during the last 25 years. Although universal access to health care to all Spanish citizens was formally defined in the 1978 Constitution and articulated in the 1986 the General Health Bill, it was until 1999 that general taxation finance ultimately substituted payroll taxes Spain is indeed a widely heterogeneous country due to economic, cultural as well as political grounds [1] . Accordingly, a devolved model of welfare governance was designed at the onset of democracy whereby health care and education became the core of the Spanish fiscal decentralisation. The Spanish health system has followed a process of 'asymmetric devolution' In its fundamental conception, devolution aims on the one hand to better serve specific health care demands and regional preferences [3] [4] [5] . On the other hand, concerns on this regard refer to the potential for an uneven geography of welfare given the split of responsibilities jointly with lack of information and coordination of the central government among regions [6] . However, scarce empirical evidenc e has been reported on the effects of devolution -and policy innovation-in health inputs, outputs and outcomes, both at the country and at the regional level in Spain.
This paper tries to cover this gap by examining the empirical evidence on regional diversity, efficiency and inequality in the Spanish system of regional health services, often named as National Health System (NHS). We undertake empirical analysis using cross-correlation, panel data and expenditure decomposition analysis. Results suggest that although the existence of significant heterogeneity, once we take region-specific needs and bring to light efficiency improvements, inequalities in inputs and outcomes do not seem to have increased over time due to decentralisation.
Consistently with other studies we find that there is no clear-cut evidence that devolution bring regional inequalities [3 -4]. Furthermore, unlike previous studies [6], we argue regional asymmetry is determined not only by supply conditions but by need, what in turn may well enhance an effect in the heterogeneity of regional health expenditure. Therefore, increasing political accountability leads to the fulfilment of region-specific conditions and demands and in turn, improves the NHS efficiency.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First we provide a basic description of the health system, its structure and expenditure trends and determinants. Section three looks at evidence on efficiency while section four examines evidence on clinical outcomes and equity both at the individual and regional level. Section five examines non-clinical outcomes. The paper concludes with a discussion section.
Description of the system, finance, expenditure and challenges

Health system goals
The Spanish National Health Service (NHS) might be envisaged as one of the most dynamic European health care systems in the last half century. In the early 1940s the health system was based on means test and covered around one fifth of the population, which expanded to almost half by 1960 and thanks to significant investment, coverage was roughly 80% by the mid 1970s. Although democracy and the 1978 Constitution defined citizens' rights to health care it was with the General Health Bill in 1986 passed by under the socialist government that health care adopted lines of a universal and decentralised NHS. Central and regional governments have put into force extended coverage and fostered the implementation of health care reforms on a decentralised basis. Finally, the conservative party ended in 1999 the gradual transition process towards a full general tax revenues financing regime and concluded in 2002 the decentralisation process of health care to all the Spanish regions (previously only just the historical regions managed health care). All this has been achieved in less than three decades.
At any rate and purpose, health care is currently the foremost policy responsibility of the AC -jointly with education accounts for 60-70% of total funds managed by AC. The transfer of health responsibilities to Catalonia was completed in 1981, followed by Andalusia (1984) Although health care is legally defined as an "essential public service" jointly with education, it is difficult to find the precise content of the health care entitlement as well as an explicit definition of NHS goals, both at the state and at the regional level. As stated in the 1986 General Health Care
Act, the NHS is expected to work towards both health promotion and illness prevention, by providing health care to all residents in Spain, and achieving equality of access as well as to help to overcome social and geographical differences. Efficiency is blurredly defined and just very recent concern buried by 'financial sustainability' goals. Therefore, the assessment of policy-goal adequacy is unavoidably normative and not always informative.
Access to health care is free at the point of use to all residents (including illegal immigrants) and user co-payments are restricted to pharmaceuticals. In 2002 funded less than 8% of public drug expenditure in 2002. Benefits are comprehensive although coverage for some services such as longterm care and dental services is limited and varies according to region-specific demands 1 . While basic legislation is in principle issued by the central state, certai n common decisions draw upon the input of the Inter-Territorial Council of the NHS -an advisory committee comprising representatives from the central and regional governments-where coordination, as legally defined, must take place.
Central governance of the NHS is formally undertaken by the Ministry of Health (MoH), although in some critical domains the Ministry of Social Security -still the owner of the buildings-and the Ministry of Finance exercise remarkable responsibilities. As a result, the MoH can be classified as comparatively weak, bearing in mind the shared responsibilities with other ministries at the central level, and the strength of regional ministries after the devolution process. A synthetic (empirical, according to the observed rules and financial flows) definition of the NHS Spanish NHS is provided in Figure 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The system structure
Health care delivery is mainly undertaken through a network of publicly owned, staffed and operated inpatient and outpatient centres, with significant geographical differences in the way services are contracted out to the private sector. Although access is free, one sixth of Spanish purchase supplementary health insurance, mostly in richer urban areas as a means for 'waiting lists avoidance' in elective care, hospital amenities and prompt access to 'soft' private health care [9-10]. Non-transparent waiting lists counterbalance tight (particularly in the last decade) NHS budgets, playing the role of actual 'implicit prices'.
Primary care in Spain has progressively moved towards a better-integrated public system, geographically organised in 'health zones' and managed at the level of the 'health area' covering 50-100 thousand inhabitants. As a result of the success of the integration of primary care in the late eighties in the NHS network, the population affiliated to a primary care physician was 91% in 2000 and the number of GP consultation has risen from 5.4 in 1994 to 6.1 in 2002 partly for prescription purposes. Ambulatory care is organised in Health Care Centres (average time per GP consultation is 6.6 minutes), where most of GPs and specific specialists work full time with a basic salary payment and a civil servant status position (instead of former capitated part-time doctors). However, capitation formulas are progressively re-introduced in financing primary care albeit limited by the fact that doctors are salaried and finance does not account for specialist referrals nor drug prescription costs (except in the case of Catalonia and Valencia for some geographical areas).
A gate keeping system was formally set up in 1986 so that patients are asked to pursue GP referral to visit the specialists unless they make use of the emergency care. Interestingly, the former is the fastest growing item of expenditure, together with drugs, of the Spanish Health system. Spain has a surplus of health professionals, which doubles the UK ratio. However, public -private practice compatibility helps the depressed relative wages of active physicians, 70% employed in the NHS.
Freedom of choice of primary care physicians within the same health area and some basic ambulatory specialists is allowed, but no much exercised.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Reforms in health care provision in Spain have lead commonly to the development of regional agencies for health care purchasing with a semi-autonomous status (commonly public corporations) brought away from the Health Departments. Catalonia and the Basque country first instituted a sort of independent public body to coordinate the public coverage function while decentralising the purchasing at health care areas. A benchmark for this is split between pubic provision and public and private (non profit) production of health care in Catalonia where more than half of the hospital activity publicly finances 'non Social Security owned beds' (see Figure 2) . The implementation of a purchaser provider split in Catalonia had sound meaning, as almost two thirds of hospitals were private (non-profit) and as a result purchasing services from private sector hospitals were comprehensively integrated with few exceptions. A weighted health care unit (UBA) was designed by the Catalan system to measure hospital activity and reimburse hospitals, which was finally adapted by the Spanish Ministry of Health. During the mid nineties, Andalusia and the Basque
Country introduced a semi-prospective payment system with DRG case-mix adjustment and
Catalonia implemented in 1998 a new tool for paying hospitals that combined payment of both structure (approached by 'Grade of membership' classification Techniques) and activity (DRGmeasured). In the nineties, INSALUD implemented a contractual system with the development of activity indicators and contracts tended to be linked to the regional health plans to improve efficiency.
The Spanish hospital network is made up of approximately 800 hospitals largely dispersed among AC. With the exception of Catalonia, where just 36% of total beds are provided by public hospitals, the system is predominantly integrated (approximately 68% being publicly owned) although contracting out implies about a 15% of public expenditure (see figure 2 ). The majority of the staff is salaried employees and hospital payment has moved from retrospective to quite-prospective payment systems. Spain displays one of the lowest EU rations of hospital beds/1000 inhabitants. The average length of stay is about 9 days and the bed occupancy rate roughly 80%. The number of beds per 1000 inhabitants is 3.9 and inpatients admissions. Interestingly, the ageing process places its effects as the most frequent age cohort; whereas in 1982 discharges of people among 75 were 6.6% in 1998 they were 17.59%. Trends exhibit a reduction in acute beds and a small rise of long term care centres. From 1997 some few public hospitals are self-governed and from 1999 some other public hospitals have become independent agencies. This has caused trade unions complaints on differences on wage and working conditions, although there is no evidence on the effects of these changes on hospital performance yet [18] .
Along with primary and inpatient care, the NHS funds 92% of the total pharmaceutical expenditure. Density of pharmacies is comparatively small and paid under margin basis. Regulation is based on a relatively recent reference pricing system although the weak generics penetration still limits its effectiveness in reducing expenditure. Other services are long term care and dental care.
Long term care coverage is limited and mostly means tested, regulated at the AC level and provided at the local level. Public home care is narrowly promoted (4% of total supply) and the involvement of the public sector financing in residential care is about 6.9% of total expenditure. Integration of health and social care is the prime difficulty, as far as social care is a responsibility of the social security and local authorities while regulation is regionally issued [18] . Dental care is mainly provided by the private sector with the exception of some minor procedures (e.g., extractions).
However, some regions have started to include coverage for dental care for children under a certain age (12 years) in their regional health care packages.
Private health care plays a complementary role for the NHS when it does not provide coverage for certain services (e.g., dental care), fulfils the demand for quality of care (hospital hotel facilities and waiting list avoidance in primary care). Moreover, private provision is substituting NHS coverage, financed by public funds, for some civil servants, at no additional cost (see figure 2 ). The share of the population with these schemes shows a steady rise pattern from 1987 (12%) to 1992 (14.5%) leading to 15.5% in 1997, and losing relative share at present (not in monetary terms given the constant increase in premiums. Up to 1999, a 15% tax relief in the personal income out of total private health expenditure was directly promoting private expenses on health care, including the purchasing of private health insurance and excluding luxury treatments (e.g., plastic surgery when this was not included in public benefits, or spa treatments). In 1994, the government unsuccessfully committed expenditure growth rates to GDP increases and imposed tighter conditions on extraordinary resources, by defining full regional responsibility for any overspending. However, this later provision was not credible due to the limited regional fiscal autonomy and regional political pressures for larger social spending. Furthermore, the distribution of funds depended on a quasi-capitation formula based on population size, barely taking into account demography, population density, or morbidity and mortality factors. In fact, the formula did not place its effects due to the establishment of a supplement to compensate those regions which decreasing population and supplementary contributions for teaching and research and for crossboundary flows were improved. property transfer and taxes on gambling). In addition, a new retailer petrol tax, earmarked to fund health care, may be optionally introduced by AC. Territorial equity is pursued by the set up of three mechanisms: a 'cohesion fund' to compensate cross boundary flows, a 'sufficiency fund' to ensure a minimum financial capacity and 'an equalisation fund' to contain regional diversity. In order to preserve cohesion by avoiding 'excessive' deviation in per capita health spending amongst regions, central transfers will help those AC that show increases in public health coverage (say due to legal immigration) three points above the Spanish average.
The resource allocation system
Decentralisation and competition structure
The decentralised design of a NHS is often grounded on the expected efficiency gains both in the production and allocation of resources, larger incentives for policy innovation, better responsiveness to citizens' demand and greater political accountability. However, conflicts refer to the extent to which a NHS should limit 'regional diversity' resulting from differences in funds and resources. Ideally, a decentralised NHS should define the "minimum" set of benefits and implicitly . In this setting the health system objectives may arguably need to be accommodated.
Furthermore, due to the political visibility of health care policy, innovation has been horizontally disseminated (in the form of positive spillovers) to other regions through a process of policy imitation, thus it is likely that inequalities both in inputs but especially in outcomes may not increase over time.
Before 2002, AC funds were the result of a political bargaining between the central and the regional Departments of Health. However, after 2002, the bargaining will be shifted between
Finance Ministers first and secondly, at the regional internal level, between the regional expenditure ministers within each AC. The regional parliaments will now have a more decisive ultimate word on heath policy issues. If we add to this a larger discretion of regional funding -based on own regional taxes, surcharges of central taxes and revenue sharing of central taxation-we should expect to open the floor for resource allocation diversity in the future. The central state requirements is a minimum departure amount (defined by regional expenses at the point of transfer), a minimum rate of increase centrally determined given the revenue increases plus an extraordinary vertical levelling fund, to be implemented in future according to the differential evolution of the population covered by the regions. Finally, a Cohesion Fund to be funded by the central budget -so far with a low starting amount will devote resources to subsidise cross boundary flows of patients amongst regions.
Some caveats exist on how the central state will compensate for new central regulations or pricing policies (new drugs to be reimbursed, and centrally authorised new health technologies among other) that affect regional expenses. A defined basic entitlement package will become a necessity if patients are not to exploit differences. Diversity itself should not be a cause for concern, provided the basic minimum package is covered, any additions are financed from regional sources and a perequalisation system exists in order to match basic expenditure needs and regional fiscal capacity. Handling other variations in policy, such as those applied to drugs, may not be straightforward. Although regions will not negotiate drug prices by themselves, they may well influence the prescribing habits of their professionals. This will pose new challenges to the marketing departments of drug companies.
Trends in expenditure and expenditure determinants
Health care expenditure accounts for 7.5 per cent of the GDP with approximately three quarters (5.5 per cent) corresponding to public expenditure and a quarter (2.1 per cent) to private expenditure (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, health care accounts on average about 40 per cent of regional expenditure, although health expenditure relative to regional GDP varies from 3.6%
Balearic Islands to 7.5% in Extremadura. Individuals can supplement the NHS by purchasing private health insurance (PHI), covering mainly primary care and hospital amenities on fixed providers' list [9-10].
[Insert Table 1 about here]
One of the most recurrent issues in examining health systems refers, indeed, to whether the NHS is over (under) financed and how health care expenditure evolves with income. Spain's share of health spending in 1980 was one of the smallest among other European NHS (Table 2) and it remained practically unaltered along the eighties until 1988 that it went up to 6.1 %, surpassing the UK and equalling Portugal the year after, Ireland (6.4%) in 1990 and surpassing Finland in 1995 (7.7%). From then on, it remained practically constant. Thus, in the last two decades there has been a steady increase in the per capita resources devoted to health care. Spain expends more than Finland (7.7%), Ireland (7%) and the United Kingdom (7%) at the time they had the same GDP per capita that Spain has today. Moreover, on the basis of our calculation, income elasticity during the eighties (1980-1989) was 1.31, during the first nineties (1990-1995) rose to 1.84 and the last nineties (1996-2000) dropped to 1.24. Therefore, from this simple analysis it cannot be concluded that health care in Spain behaves as a luxury good.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
When examining health expenditure layers, main highlights are that whereas inpatient care increased significantly during the eighties, in the nineties relative expenditure decreased, mainly thanks to contracting out systems, as well as reforms in the primary care sector (see data on Appendix A1-A2). From the first nineties we find that about 55% is spent on inpatient and specialised care, 16% is devoted to primary care, research and public health account for 4%, and pharmaceuticals have been steadily rising from 18% in mid nineties to 23% in 2002. Outpatient expenditure remained stable, always lower than 1% of the GDP. During the period 1986-1992 relative pharmaceutical expenditure raised 40%. The average costs by receipt, due to the progressive reduction of effective co-payments from 1980's, reflect this feature. Interestingly, due to the co-payment system, the share of public pharmaceutical expenditure by pensioners has raised steadily being 39.2% in 1980, and almost twice at present. Prevention still represents a negligible magnitude (0.1% of the GDP) remaining constant across the period. Expenditure on personal was moderately around 4-5% of the GDP during the eighties, however after the implementation of the primary care reform and the regional devolution of health care, it went up to the 7%.
Prices in the health sector have been slightly higher than those in the rest of the economy though the differential was not increasingly wide. Therefore, other determinants are behind the health expenditure rise. They include health care coverage, the ageing process and especially significant changes in utilisation patterns. 
Efficiency
At the macro level
Compared to other NHS countries, Spain ranks in a middle situation in health spending, once health expenditure is regressed on GDP it places in the exact point of the fitted line. In terms of overall performance it is fifth in the WHO table. This suggests that 'good value for money' seems then to be achieved at the aggregate level. In the past, health care reforms have tended to focus on cost-containment -mainly by defining positive and negative drug lists -but hardly ever there is an explicit assessment on what the health system buys. Cost containment goals lead to the definition of the basic package of benefits covered by the Spanish NHS. This was defined as distinguishing primary care, specialised care, pharmaceutical benefits and finally complementary benefits (i.e prostheses, orthopaedic products, etc). As a result of this definition, some benefits were implicitly excluded from coverage, such as some mental health treatments and diagnosis tests (psychoanalysis and hypnosis) and dental care (although Navarre and the Basque Country do provide some additional coverage), sex-change treatments (explicitly covered in Andalusia), regular health checks or plastic surgery. The (implicit) package does not include social nor community care. Some low therapeutic value drugs are excluded too (in this case in an explicit way).
Organisational Innovation
The Spanish system may be briefly characterized for the former purpose as follows: 
3.3Evidence from efficiency studies
Unlike other countries, there is no systematic independent public review on the efficiency of health care organizations in Spain. Non-systematic exceptions are the reviews undertaken by the
Society for Public Health and Health Services Administration (SESPAS) and the regular surveys from the Annual meetings of the Spanish Health Economics Association (AES). Since 2003 an
Observatory of the Spanish Health System is reporting on the evolution of the main health care indicators on a regional basis. focus on relative measures of efficiency in hospitals and primary health care, along with factors explaining variations in efficiency levels and changes in total factor productivity. Here we distinguish studies on hospital and primary care efficiency.
Generally speaking efficiency studies are not commonly standardised in the international arena, and neither they are in Spain. Therefore, here we revise those that offer results with significant policy implications [18, 22-37]. Some evidence using frontier models suggests that privately funded hospitals improve allocative efficiency better than public and non-for profit hospitals Of course all these changes involve some potential risks still not confirmed in practice (higher transaction costs, violation of some minimum risk pools, cultural values against profit incentives and budget surplus in health care provision) and create a political response by those who prefer the old system and accus e the Catalan government of privatising health care. Since public finance and public regulation are maintained, these claims are difficult to sustain. The absence of non profit bureaucratic provision does not mean that a preference for consumers or social goals is absent, since consumer surplus may be lost by larger production costs under pure public production.
Limited for profit incentive s do not mean patients' welfare exploitation by producers when free choice and non-territorial monopolies are present. Furthermore, the job of the regulator needs to be more responsive and alert because its mistakes will be more apparent than the mistakes on hierarchical ruling of public organizations.
In short, despite the fact that the Catalonian Health System can show a rather successful record in institutional innovations in health care, organizational change is a very limited strategy for health care reforms in public systems. It is not a surrogate for the necessary clarification of the extent of the private sector involvement in public health care, nor a substitute for an open discussion on its adequate mix of public and private finance.
Micro-efficiency and regional heterogeneity
Several layers as the rise of relative health care prices, adoption of "expensive" new technologies and health care intensity influence efficiency. Therefore, an issue to examine is whether there are significant differences in health care resources across AC, especially capital and labour inputs and technology available. Beginning by capital, Cantabria (5.7) and Catalonia (5) display the highest number of beds by 1000 population, while Andalusia (3.26) and Valencia (3) have the smallest rate. This reveals that differences in the beds rate by 1000 inhabitants cannot be regarded to decentralisation; the coefficient of variation (CV) was the same across all regions.
However, significant differences were found in the public -private fix of beds, 82% of beds were in publicly owned INSALUD hospitals in contrast to 32% in Catalonia. Hospital infrastructure evidence shows that only 20% of hospitals in Catalonia are public (46% are general hospitals, 5% mental hospitals and 30% are nursing homes) and one third in Basque Country (58% are general hospitals, 16% mental hospitals and 18% nursing homes), Balearic Islands (72% are general hospitals) and Madrid (44% are general hospitals, 12% are mental health hospitals and 10% are nursing homes). In the last three, about two thirds of the beds were provided by public institutions, indicating the presence of small private centres.
Despite differences in size, there are significant differences in hospital specialisation.
Commonly, the richer the AC is, the larger the number of small and specialised hospitals. Regarding labour inputs Navarre and Madrid concentrate the largest physician density, as they are areas with large activity and huge hospitals whilst poorer AC concentrate less physicians. Once more, heterogeneity cannot be regarded to devolution as inequality within INSALUD regions was higher that the rest. Nurse density rate was higher for AC with devolved responsibilities. An additional source of regional heterogeneity is technology equipment. Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and Andalusia concentrate more than 50% of equipment in hospitals.
When examining the rate of technology we found that X-Rays are highly used in the Basque 
Inequality
Health outcomes and avoidable mortality
As other developed countries, Spain has experienced a very significant improvement in health during these decades (Tables 3 and 4 [Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here] Table 3 reports estimations on avoidable age-gender standardised premature mortality for 1998. Estimates suggest that although there is a north-south pattern, not related to regional health care expenditure, some regions as Catalonia perform better in both measures of premature mortality whereas some others Basque Country expedience low mortality for health policy related diseases and large mortality for health service related diseases.
Socio-economic inequalities in health and health care
An important issue when examining the impact of health care system reforms in NHS countries is the effect of specific policies on influencing social cohesion and the extent in which the When examining inequalities in health outcomes, several studies evidence that there is a socioeconomic vector which explains differences in adjusted mortality, prevalence and self -reported health status [52] . Finally, regarding progresivity of health expenditure, around a quarter of total financing refers to indirect taxation (which is well known to be regressive) and the remaining financed through direct taxes. The combination of both sources shows that the financing system has become less progressive [53].
Inter-regional health and health care inequalities
Devolution often raises concerns on the impact of diversity on social cohesion. 
Intra-regional health inequalities
Other than focussing on inter-regions inequalities, one of the largest concerns is the existence of intra-regional disparities. We do not have generally good studies on the estimation of intra-regional disparities and their determinants. Geographic patterns of mortality seem to highlight some spatial distribution of mortality linked to the variation in social and environmental feature. Small areas so-called 'zones" where constructed in this purpose to study the distribution of the comparative mortality ratio (CMR) [54] . Out of eight AC with ratios above 100, six were located in the south of Spain. However, by examining the d ifference between the maximum CMR and minimum it is found that the largest difference is in Valencia and Canary Islands and the smallest difference is identified in La Rioja, Navarre, Asturias and Cantabria. Therefore, it can be argued that large inequalities within small areas of specific AC still remain. Other dimensions of intraregional inequalities refers to differences in resources, being the lowest in the Basque Country (CV=0.16) what could be attributed to the significant rise in public inpatient care and the success in extending the primary care reform. The opposite apply to Catalonia with high variability in outpatient care (CV=0.6) where the primary care reform was slower.
The association between inputs, outputs and outcomes
Available data (1985-1999, A positive correlation between relative supply of beds and physician concentration is found (r=0.6, p<0.1). As expected, we find a positive association between length of stay (LOS) and the bed occupancy rate (r=0.78, p<0.05). Interestingly, the higher the relative supply of beds, the higher the LOS (r=0.71, p<0.05) and the higher is the occupancy rate (r=0.67, p<0.05). In addition, we find a negative association between rotation and LOS (r=0.92, p<0.05) and occupancy rate (r=0.56, p<0.05). Finally, we examined the correlation coefficients between several health care indicators and resources and we found the following. First, female life expectancy was both associated with supply of beds (r=0.60. p<0.01) and physicians (r=0.68, p>0.01). The number of beds was negatively correlated with infant mortality (r=-0.61, p>0.01), neonatal mortality (r= -0.68, p>0.01) and perinatal mortality (r=-0.44, p>0.05).
Although acknowledging the limitations of a cross-correlation analysis, there is no easily identifiable pattern on morbid-mortality factors capable to be located on a geographical basis and related to regional differences in health care inputs. However, as expected there is an association between technology and input availability with expenditure. Results suggest, by comparing trends in expenditure, utilisation and outcomes at the regional level, before and after the decentralization process, that differences in health care inputs are not systematically reflected into differences in outcomes. These are mostly related to within regions health related policies and not to the existing (minor) financial variation of resources amongst regions.
Citizens' perceptions and satisfaction
There is not much information about non-clinical dimensions of quality in Spain. The exception to this rule refers to satisfaction surveys which are contentious to interpret to the extent that might not evolve with real NHS developments. Roughly speaking, Spain occupies a middle-low position compared to other EU member states [55] [56] . More than 50% of citizens perceive differences between urban and rural areas (Table 6 ). With regards to decentralisation 38% perceive that this has improved health care quality while 33% thinks that nothing will be changed [Insert Table 5 about here]
Choice as a non-clinical outcome has traditionally conferred a low priority by public authorities. However, some AC have introduced the free choice of GP (Andalusia, and Catalonia within PC teams), a maximum waiting time before allowing patients freely to access to private practice publicly financed in Castilla-La Mancha , and several provisions on this respect have been approved both at the regional and central levels during the 1990s such as the possibility of a second specialist advice in Canary islands and later exported to other regions, and the set up in the early nineties of the freedom of choice of GP within urban areas for the 10 INSALUD AC.
Other two issues that deserve some analysis are responsiveness and accountability concerns on citizens and patient acceptance of the NHS. Health care is the main priority for Spaniards jointly with housing and education. The analysis at the regional level of the representative surveys (Barometro Sanitario) highlights that health care is the main priority in 12 out of 17 AC. The vast majority of the population believes that the system needs minor changes, being the Basque Country and Navarre the AC where most of the population agreed on that the system was working well or needed minor changes. Balearic Islands and Canary Islands, receiving a large amount of tourists a year, being those AC in which a larger share of population perceives that significant changes are needed.
Decentralisation and the set up of a democracy in Spain can qualify as the two main issues that have influenced the most the political accountability. The Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) provides data on responsiveness suggesting that during the nineties 66% disagreed on paying more taxes and believed that it was possible to maintain the services by reducing taxes for public services but about the same percentage agreed from 1987-1998 that the government was responsible for welfare. Finally, a reducing share of 11% agrees on taxing for redistribute purposes.
Conclusions
This paper draws on examining the developments of the Spanish NHS during the last two decades whereby devolution and NHS consolidation have simultaneously taken place. Although 'ideal data' is not always available, this study find comprehensive evidence pointing out that Spain has sought to decentralise the health system without weakening inter-regional social cohesion. We have focussed our study in examining regional diversity, efficiency and inequality in the Spanish NHS. Results suggest that regardless of significant heterogeneity, once we take into account regionspecific needs; there is evidence on innovations for efficiency improvements whilst inequalities in inputs and outcomes do not seem to have increased over time at the state level. Therefore, regional diversity in the Spanish universal NHS does not seem to be promoted at the expense of geographical inequalities. Moreover, decentralisation of health care to regions has helped to break a more central monolithic bureaucratic pattern and spill financial pressures over more politically and fiscally more accountable regions. In doing so, devolution has proven to drive policy innovation.
In the light of these results, we argue that in order to promote quality improvements a ke y 
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Key words: Finance refers to the revenue sources; provison to the service responsabilities; production, regards to who produces the service; and supply, to the inputs ownership. Prices can be identified with direct expenditure and premia with indirect expenditure. Source: own elaboration, from different sources. In the second bracket, similar figure for the region of Catalonia, with the most different idyosincratic model oh health care. 
